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Existing research on states and human rights focuses primarily on international treaty 
ratification, post-treaty rating systems, and ad hoc reports on adherence in individual countries.  
Additionally, the literature is characterized by disproportionate attention to certain rights to the 
neglect of others, thereby painting an incomplete and potentially inaccurate picture of a state‘s 
practice and implementation of human rights.  Consequently, the extant literature too frequently 
disregards key domestic and international factors as determinants of cross-national variation in 
the implementation and protection of human rights, and it instead generates paradoxical claims 
about human rights and state behavior.  With Europe as its empirical focus, this study tests one 
assertion that state strength relative to societal actors impacts the frequency of cases heard at the 
European Court of Human Rights.  Findings suggest that state strength indeed plays a role in the 
overall number of cases from member states in the European human rights system. 
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What explains cross-national variation in case volume at the European Court of Human 
Rights?  Human rights are routinely depicted as essential elements necessary for the well-being 
of any legitimate state and its society.  Their very existence and defense are central to the theory 
and practice of international relations.  Rights-based treaties and their attendant policies are 
purportedly designed to create more accountability in international law and to accommodate the 
increasingly transnational organization of 21
st
 century civil societies.  A state‘s open 
commitment to these elements, whether through ratifying treaties or legislating new protections, 
is welcomed and typically rewarded by the international community.  Yet, as has been repeatedly 
shown, there is a significant difference between a state‘s public commitments and its actual 
human rights practices. 
  To illustrate the variation that exists even across countries that have formally committed 
to respecting human rights, Table 1 provides one measure of case volume across the 47 member 
states of the Council of Europe during the 2006-2010 period.  Each country has established its 
commitment to the protection of human rights by ratifying the European Convention on Human 
Rights and by becoming a member state of the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe.  The 
Council has its own legal arm, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), charged with 
ensuring the full implementation of the European Convention and the rights outlined within it.  
The data below, provided by the Court, illustrate the number of applications that are submitted 
from each member state to one of the Court‘s judicial bodies relative to that state‘s population in 
that year.  The figures were calculated to reflect the number of applications submitted for every 
10,000 people.  Overall, the numbers are generally low (below 1.0) and appear stable over time.  
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However, inspection reveals evidence of some apparent variation with some cases exceeding 1.0 
(indeed, rising as high as 6.68 in Slovenia). 
 
Table 1.   Allocated Applications by State and Population (2006-2010) 
      Applications Allocated to a Judicial Body/Population (10,000) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  
Albania 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.31 0.30  
Andorra 1.07 0.50 0.12 0.69 0.94  
Armenia 0.30 1.90 0.33 0.40 0.61  
Austria 0.42 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.52  
Azerbaijan 0.26 0.83 0.39 0.40 0.37  
Belgium 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.28  
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.63 1.82 2.53 1.65 1.71  
Bulgaria 0.97 1.07 1.16 1.57 1.78  
Croatia 1.44 1.26 1.37 1.70 2.24  
Cyprus 0.73 0.81 0.83 0.74 1.47  
Czech Republic 2.41 0.78 0.69 0.69 0.58  
Denmark 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.17  
Estonia 1.37 1.14 1.26 1.52 1.98  
Finland 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.92 0.70  
France 0.29 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.25  
Georgia 0.24 0.37 4.04 5.03 0.85  
Germany 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.21  
Greece 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.46 0.52  
Hungary 0.42 0.53 0.42 0.45 0.44  
Iceland 0.40 0.29 0.22 0.31 0.47  
Ireland 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.14  
Italy 0.16 0.23 0.31 0.60 0.64  
Latvia 1.17 1.02 1.09 1.44 1.20  
Liechtenstein 0.29 1.42 2.26 3.92 4.17  
Lithuania 0.60 0.67 0.76 0.78 0.73  
Luxembourg 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.59 0.88  
Malta 0.40 0.44 0.29 0.34 0.55  
Moldova 1.43 2.48 3.21 3.70 2.65  
Monaco 1.25 3.13 1.56 2.73 3.94  
Montenegro … 1.46 2.49 4.30 4.82  
Netherlands 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.44  
Norway 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.18  
Poland 1.04 1.10 1.15 1.31 1.51  
Portugal 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.17  
Romania 1.53 1.47 2.43 2.45 2.79  
Russia 0.70 0.67 0.71 0.97 1.01  
San Marino 0.69 0.32 1.30 0.63 1.29  
Serbia 0.75 1.43 1.45 1.60 2.14  
Slovakia 0.90 0.65 0.90 1.05 1.05  
Slovenia 6.68 5.03 6.68 2.91 4.07  
Spain 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.15  
Sweden 0.41 0.40 0.35 0.40 0.96  
Switzerland 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.61 0.47  
The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
1.45 2.22 1.93 2.39 2.06  
Turkey 0.32 0.39 0.53 0.59 0.80  
Ukraine 0.53 0.97 1.03 1.03 0.87  
United Kingdom 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.45  





 Far from representing only random data points, these population-adjusted case frequency 
numbers may provide important indicators of the actual respect for human rights within member 
states.  For further context, Table 2 offers a preliminary picture of current human rights ratings in 
the same countries.  The scores are averaged from Freedom House‘s political and civil liberties 
ratings and arranged in ascending order.  Freedom House‘s rating scale is defined as follows; 
Free: 1.0-2.5, Partly Free: 3.0-5.0, and Not Free: 5.5-7.0.  The Freedom House ratings scheme 
provides a suitable proxy here for human rights primarily because ―the methodology of the 
survey is grounded in basic standards of political rights and civil liberties, derived in large 
measure from relevant portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These standards 
apply to all countries and territories, irrespective of geographical location, ethnic or religious 
composition, or level of economic development.‖1  The member states of the European Human 
Rights system have each ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, the region‘s major 
human rights treaty.  The Convention was modeled after the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as a way to enforce those rights outlined in the Declaration in its ratifying member states.  
All states are thus formally bound under the jurisdiction of its human rights institutions, which 






                                                          
1 Freedom House, Inc. Welcome to Freedom House: Methodology. 2008. 





Table 2.         Combined Average Ratings – Independent Countries 
Country PCR Country PCR 
Andorra 1 Spain 1 
Austria 1 Sweden 1 
Belgium 1 Switzerland 1 
Cyprus 1 United Kingdom 1 
Czech Republic 1 Croatia 1.5 
Denmark 1 Greece 1.5 
Estonia 1 Italy 1.5 
Finland 1 Monaco 1.5 
France 1 Bulgaria 2 
Germany 1 Latvia 2 
Hungary 1 Serbia 2 
Iceland 1 Romania 2 
Ireland 1 Montenegro 2.5 
Liechtenstein 1 Albania 3 
Lithuania 1 Moldova 3 
Luxembourg 1 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 3 
Malta 1 Turkey 3 
Netherlands 1 Ukraine 3 
Norway 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.5 
Poland 1 Georgia 3.5 
Portugal 1 Armenia 5 
San Marino 1 Azerbaijan 5.5 
Slovakia 1 Russia 5.5 
Slovenia 1   




At first glance, it appears that Tables 1 and 2 contradict one another.  For example, in 
Table 2 Freedom House rates two member states (e.g., Russia and Azerbaijan) as being on the 
threshold of ―not free.‖  Yet, ECHR data show a low number (below 1) of applications coming 
from both states relative to their population in all four years prior to 2010.  Alternatively, 
Liechtenstein has been showing an increase in the number of applications with the number well 
above 1 (4.17) in 2010. However, Freedom House rates Liechtenstein with the highest ―free‖ 
rating of 1.  Slovenia, Romania, and Croatia are three additional states considered ―free‖ 
according to Freedom House despite showing their number of allocated cases increasing or 
fluctuating yet still remaining above 1.  Because Slovenia is a member of the European Union, 
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the variation illustrated in the tables above suggests that whether or not a state is a member of the 
EU does not consistently determine the number of cases advanced to the Court.  
We therefore have temporal and cross-national variation, as well as apparent 
contradiction between a ratings scheme and trends in grievances brought to a court of last appeal.  
This illustration of the apparent variation between case numbers and ratings schemes creates a 
paradox, which has largely been the focus of current research on states‘ declared commitments to 
human rights and their behavior.  To date, most published research focuses on state ratification 
of human rights treaties and on compliance as depicted by index ratings or country reports.  Like 
Table 2 above, such ratings and reports are treated as proxies for measuring the progress of states 
in upholding their treaty commitments and thus illustrating a kind of record in human rights 
practices.  These studies seek to explain why it is that among a set of states—each of which has 
ratified the same treaty or treaties—there are some with  better apparent records than others.  
With the exception of some recent efforts by constructivists, the extant literature is 
predominantly populated by rationalist approaches that venture little beyond attempting to 
explain why states ratify treaties.  As a consequence, these studies have created a literature in 
which the focus on state costs and interests is so strong that a grim picture emerges.  To 
illustrate, Hathaway (2002), Simmons (2009), and Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) all claim 
that human rights treaties and international systems actually—and indeed paradoxically—make 
conditions worse on the ground for human rights.  One reason for the bleak assessments may lie 
in the methods used by aggregated human rights rating scales and yearly case reports such those 
provided by Amnesty International.  Too frequently, these scales lose important information by 
dichotomizing state performance (i.e., ratified/did not ratify) or undervaluing the lifecycle of 
post-ratification implementation processes.   
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 The ratification of a human rights treaty is consistently treated as a proxy for the telling 
moment of a state‘s commitment to human rights values and norms, yet post-ratification 
variation across states is still evident.  As will be demonstrated, previous research has largely 
failed to recognize that actual adherence to human rights values and norms is a lengthy process 
(perhaps even multi-generational) that is shaped differently in different country contexts by 
alternative configurations of domestic and international factors.  Such variation and contradiction 
provide the puzzles that drive this research investigation.  While recognizing a wide range of 
potential influences on post-ratification human rights practices within countries, this study 
narrows its focus to those factors that confound compliance and that help explain cross-national 
variation in case submissions to the ECHR.  As will be explained, the number of cases does not 
necessarily reflect a state‘s actual respect for human rights (i.e., a high number of cases equaling 
less commitment or worse conditions).   Instead, the number of cases from each state may be 
more appropriately seen as reflecting the degree to which it utilizes the Court over time and 
ultimately how well it implements its commitment to the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  While other arguments pertaining to the indications of case volume are prevalent and 
valid, the present study holds that the volume of cases each state submits to the European Court 
indicates simply its use of the Court. 
Despite the Court‘s utilization by states, some human rights issues and even violations 
could be overlooked within domestic borders as cases in the Court are violations that have 
successfully passed the criteria of exhausting all domestic remedies and have additionally passed 
the process of being forwarded to a judicial body in Strasbourg.  Such a process can take several 
years before it is heard in the European Court.  While there are several causal mechanisms 
studied in the literature, this study will focus on the overall strength a government maintains over 
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its citizens and institutions.  The primary hypothesis of this study is that state strength affects the 
volume complaints leaving national jurisdictions for review by an international institution. This, 
in turn, reflects states‘ ability to exercise and utilize international human rights institutions and 
conventions to which they are signatories.    A state generating more submissions to the Court 
may illustrate fidelity to upholding the Convention and utilizing the Court, whereas a state 
forwarding fewer cases may be indicative of a domestic system that inhibits claims.  A third 
plausible alternative is that states with fewer cases sent to the ECHR may be more effectively 
resolving alleged human rights violations within national judicial processes, thereby limiting 
appeals to a supranational Court.  The thesis seeks to enhance clarity on these alternatives by, 
first, identifying broad cross-national patterns using quantitative data.  That approach is then 




The most controversial studies within the literature of human rights and international law 
are those claiming that treaty ratification worsens human rights conditions (Hathaway 2002, 
Simmons 2009, and Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005).  Most of these studies tend to side with 
the rationalist literature in claiming that states use treaty ratification as a form of ―window 
dressing‖ (Hafner-Burton 2005, 1381) and that they are disingenuously seeking carrots (or at 
least the avoidance of sticks) from the international community rather than the actual 
enhancement of human conditions.  Much of this literature is vulnerable to criticism on grounds 
of overreliance on incomplete and unreliable large-N datasets that apply questionable 
assumptions across all states (Barsh 1993).  Moreover, the myopic focus on internationally 
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orchestrated ratification—to the exclusion of factors pre- and post-dating that act—is 
problematic.  Ignoring domestic-level contexts of signatory states brings with it some significant 
explanatory peril.     
At first glance, the distinction between a strong state and a weak one appears reversed 
and even paradoxical, yet upon further inspection the apparent paradox is lost and a clearer 
distinction is revealed.  In the absence of national institutional remedies, one way to hold states 
accountable for treaty violations is to design supranational institutions with enforcement powers.  
However, strong centralized states can, either expressly or indirectly, have a restrictive effect on 
citizen access to such institutions.  This may be especially true in a system such as Europe‘s 
where by rule all domestic means of addressing human rights violations must be exhausted 
before reaching the Court in Strasbourg.  A more centralized state would thus be classified as a 
strong state.  Additionally, contrary to what is immediately assumed a high number of cases in 
the ECHR does not necessarily mean that a state is fraught with more rights violations or is less 
committed to its treaty obligations.  More cases could indicate that the state is effectively 
respecting the Court and adhering to rather than sidestepping its obligations.  This means that 
citizens within a state with a higher number of cases may face fewer barriers to accessing not just 
the ECHR but also all necessarily prior venues for presenting their grievances.    A state such as 
this would thus be referred to as a weak state because it does not exercise the same gatekeeping 
capacity to restrict submissions to Strasbourg.  A weak state, however, is not synonymous with a 
weak democracy. 
 A strong state on the other hand, could possibly be shown to constrict access to 
Strasbourg for several reasons.  Cases could be prevented from appearing in the European Court 
either because they are settled within or even outside domestic institutions thus never coming to 
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the attention of the Council, or simply because access to domestic remedies is more difficult than 
within a weak state.  Suppression at lower levels pre-empts and prevents exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, which is required before a case will be considered by the ECHR.  Additionally, a 
strong state with a smaller caseload in the European Court could also offer a window into the 
establishment of its domestic legal institutions.  Fewer complaints could be leaving domestic 
borders either because human rights cases are successfully settled within domestic courts or the 
opposite could be true.  All speculation on these possibilities are valid and valuable, however 
gaining an exact explanation into a state‘s exercise of strength and its activity in domestic courts 
is a challenge in itself.  Therefore, one of the purposes of this study is to gain an insight and offer 
preliminary ideas into whether state strength is acting as a type of filter, either hindering or 
allowing human rights case submissions past its borders and into the hands of an international 
legal body in addition to illustrating the overall resort to or use of an international court by its 
member states. 
 
Strong State vs. Weak State 
 Scholars have emphasized the importance of state strength in enforcing international 
human rights domestically.  Boyle and Thompson (2001) use state strength as an independent 
variable, and hypothesize that the degree of domestic strength a state has can indicate how well 
domestic institutions are utilized in addition to revealing the resort to international mechanisms 
when those same domestic institutions fail to accommodate violations.  Boyle and Thompson 
defend their reasons for observing state strength by stating that the same activities that lead to 
claims in one country may continue to be overlooked in another (Waters 1996).  Boyle and 
Thompson thus define a weak state as being characterized by formal divisions of power and 
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policymaking processes that are open to civil societies.  As explained by the authors, weak states 
tend to ―foster more domestic mobilization and legal activity by providing more opportunities to 
impede or challenge political or legal decision making‖ (Boyle and Thompson 323).   
On the other hand, a strong state makes a clear distinction between the state and its civil 
society.  Civil servants are the main operators working in very specific roles and are kept 
separate from the state‘s civil society.  ―The operating logic of highly differentiated states is that 
special interests and power relationships taint statements of individual interest and make it 
undesirable and impractical to draw policy directly from individuals within society‖ (Boyle and 
Thompson 324).  This system gives the state authority to determine and act for the collective 
welfare of the citizenry.  Strong states thus are able to effectively define the public good and 
serve it in a more concentrated highly bureaucratic fashion.  Additionally, the people within 
strong states tend to look first to the state to solve problems or concerns within the state rather 
than to take matters into their own hands.  Boyle and Thompson claim that a state‘s strength, 
which has been shown to affect legal activity domestically, also has similar tendencies and 
results internationally.  The strength of a state can thus offer an insight into how human rights 
commitments are carried out domestically, but also internationally.  In their study Boyle and 
Thompson find that weak states do produce more case submissions to the European human rights 
system.  A strong state on the other hand produces fewer because it is ―likely to filter or preempt 
individual action, including legal action at the international level, just as it does at the local 
level‖ (Boyle and Thompson (337).  The Boyle and Thompson study inspires and informs the 
present analysis, but given limits on their data (e.g., case numbers and years), this thesis seeks to 
both corroborate and extend their findings. 
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Without directly stating it, Boyle and Thompson hint that a weak state tends to be a more 
democratic one.  In a conventional sense, a democratic state would not have many claims 
appearing in an institution such as the European Court of Human Rights.  However, Boyle and 
Thompson find that most claims appearing in the European Court are from weak or more 
democratic states (2001, 326).  This does not necessarily mean that democratic states yield more 
violations or have weaker protection and implementation over nondemocratic states.  Indeed one 
common finding in the literature of human rights that is consistently highlighted among scholars 
and will serve as a control variable in this study, is the fact that democratic countries are better at 
protecting and implementing human rights and thus have better overall human rights outcomes 
(Hathaway 2002, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, Simmons 2009, Neumayer 2005, Boyle and 
Thompson 2001).  This focus has flourished in the literature on human rights and a state‘s 
interests can take on forms as simple as the fundamental values a state holds (Neumayer 2005, 
Simmons 2009) to the nature of the state.   
 
Structure of Domestic Legal System 
The connection and eventual responsibility of the state in adapting international human 
rights law lies within its domestic courts.  As several scholars have previously expressed 
(Simmons 2009, Conforti and Francioni 1997), domestic courts need to cooperate with 
international mechanisms and legal systems in order to see implementation of human rights and 
other matters of international law universally.  In the case of the European human rights system, 
for example, complaints must have exhausted all domestic courts and legal mechanisms before 
they can be considered by the European Court of Human Rights.   
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The legal nature of a state has been studied in its effects on a state‘s human rights 
practices.  Some studies find that common law systems are more reluctant to recognize not only 
human rights, but any international legal system because its domestic institutions raise barriers or 
create disincentives to not only ratify fundamental treaties but also, and most importantly, 
implement them thus reflecting the state as a poor observer of human rights (Henkin 1995).  
Other scholars concentrate on the impact this characterization has on domestic courts and its 
eventual impact on its citizenry.  Drzemczewski, for example, explains that a state whose 
constitution does not allow for the supremacy of international law has reflected the extreme 
difficulty its domestic courts have in accommodating international law into their respective legal 
systems (1983, 233).   
Wildhaber refers to these barriers and impact on domestic courts as telling signs of 
whether a state has a dualist or monist approach towards international law.  According to 
Wildhaber, a state is said to be dualist if it treats international law and domestic law as two 
separate and distinguishable bodies of law.  Using the European Convention on Human Rights as 
an example, Wildhaber claims that most of these countries ―have incorporated the Convention 
into their domestic legal order and apply it now faithfully and effectively‖ (Wildhaber 2007, 
218).  Wildhaber explains that the classically dualist countries currently in the Council are the 
Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries that have traditionally supported the dualist approach.   
Monist states on the other hand, are those that see international and domestic law as part 
of the same system of law.  Although he acknowledges that few countries subscribe to the idea 
that the European Convention on Human Rights is viewed on the same level as constitutional 
law, Wildhaber feels the need to elaborate on his definition; ―the term monism can either mean 
that the Convention is directly applicable in municipal law, or that it is applicable at the level of 
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statutory law, or at the level of constitutional law, or at an above-statutory level, superior to 
statutes, but inferior to the Constitution.  He concludes his definition by claiming ―this is the case 
for the vast majority of the new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe‖ (Wildhaber 218-
219).   
 
Regional Human Rights Systems 
One intriguing factor that most human rights scholars touch upon but do not adequately 
or directly address is the unique possibility of regional human rights systems and their impact on 
state  implementation of human rights.  Hathaway acknowledges that states are more likely to 
ratify and implement regional human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights, over universal ones (2000), recognizing the importance and possibilities with regional 
institutions like a human rights court.  Hathaway states that regional treaties such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights tend to include stronger enforcement and monitoring 
mechanisms than universal ones.  The European Convention and even the American Convention 
―put in place courts that can hold party states that accept the court‘s jurisdiction accountable for 
violations of rights established by the treaties, and the treaties contain individual and state-to-
state compliant mechanisms‖ (2017).  This statement acknowledges the fact that human rights do 
not exist in a vacuum but do require political institutions to define, promote, and protect them 
(Walzer 2006, 228).  Hathaway also admits that there have been examples of changes in 
domestic laws or practices by ratifying states to the European Convention in response to 
decisions from the European Court of Human Rights.  Yet regardless of whether or not a 
member state utilizes or recognizes decisions by such implementation mechanisms, variation in 
the actual utilization or activity from member states in an international legal body continues to 
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exist even within the European human rights system despite its strong enforcement and 
monitoring.   
The overall literature of human rights has created a broad field in which many factors are 
claimed to contribute to a state‘s commitment to human rights.  Yet most of this literature does 
not focus on domestic dynamics within states.  Exceptions include studies of the role of NGOs 
and mobilization (Goodman and Jinks 2003, Jenkins 1983, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, 
Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004, Chandler 2001), history of and/or the establishment of democracy 
(Hathaway 2002, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, Simmons 2009, Neumayer 2005), and the 
practice of naming and shaming (Johnston 1997, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, Simmons 2009).  
Yet the above examples of domestic factors that have been studied can arguably be said to still 
require third parties in order to be implemented. While acknowledging the factors listed above 
by controlling for them, this study argues that state strength plays a vital role in how a state 
utilizes international institutions designed with the intention of upholding certain human rights 
practices and expectations.   
 
 
HYPOTHESIS AND INDICATORS 
 Despite being under constant reform, the European human rights system is consistently 
regarded as the most effective and developed supranational institution with its own international 
legal body for the protection and implementation of human rights.  The European human rights 
system, which is established by the Council of Europe, currently contains 47 member states that 
have each ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and its 18 articles.  The European 
Court of Human Rights provides yearly statistical data not only on the Court‘s activities, but also 
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on each of the 47 member states‘ activities within the Court since the beginning of their 
membership to the Council of Europe.   
The Court‘s data include telling statistics such as details of cases brought to the Court 
from a member state including the number of cases forwarded to a judicial body of the Court, the 
number of those cases that were then struck out, and even the nature of the cases in regards to 
articles of the European Convention that are being violated.  Thus data provided by the Court 
serve as an indicator for human rights implementation and progress within member states and 
their impact on the international level as the Court allows for both individuals and states to file 
complaints to be considered in its jurisdiction.  While inter-state complaints are rare, the 
individual right to petition the Court is a compulsory feature to all 47 member states.  The 
European Court states that this right applies to ―natural and legal persons, groups of individuals, 
and to non-governmental organizations‖ (The European Court of Human Rights 2009).  The 
Council of Europe adds ―A State condemned by the European Court of Human Rights is obliged 
to adopt individual measures such as restitution or the re-opening of the procedure. The Court 
may also order the State to pay the applicant a sum of money as ‗just satisfaction‘, in that the 
money in question serves as compensation and erases the consequences for the victim‖ (The 
Council of Europe 2010).  These requirements alone thus provide an insight into the internal 
workings in the process of implementing human rights within a state. 
The present thesis does not claim to have the answer to the overall question of why some 
states show better commitments or practices of human rights over others.  While this is perhaps 
one of the most essential questions yet to be answered in the field of human rights and even 
international law, this study instead seeks to examine a smaller part of the puzzle by observing a 
regional institutional body specifically founded and committed to implementing respect for 
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human rights within its member states.  This study serves as a continuation of Boyle and 
Thompson‘s 2001 study, which addressed the same question in attempting to explain why there 
is existent variation in human rights cases from member states in the Council of Europe.  While 
Boyle and Thompson raise questions not only about states‘ actions in human rights 
implementation, they also raised questions about the workings of the Council of Europe.  Yet in 
reviewing their study further, there are some fundamental improvements which need to be 
addressed in order to gain a better insight into the question of variation among states.  
Additionally the Council of Europe and especially its human rights court, remains a type of 
institutional experiment as it is continually undergoing reforms and development.  The present 
thesis can thus serve as starting point and continuation for future study and research into the 
workings of the Council.  
Boyle and Thompson‘s study, although published in 2001, uses data from the Council of 
Europe between 1976 and 1993.  This means only 30 member states were studied, of which none 
were from the most recent member states to have ratified the European Convention and are 
subject to the ECHR.  Also, and perhaps most importantly, during this time period the procedure 
for bringing a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights first required submitting a case 
to the European Commission on Human Rights, a branch of the European human rights system 
designated with the task of filtering claims coming from member states to the Court.  In 1998, 
the Court was transformed into a full-time court and the process of direct submission by citizens 
from member states to the Court without the procedural approval of the Commission was made 
possible (Wildhaber 2007, 225).  From the time the Court was reformed as a full-time court, an 
influx of cases inundated the Court as the numbers of complaints increased and continues to do 
so.  The Court itself continues to be reformed in order provide better management of case loads.  
17 
 
Additionally, the Court‘s statistics have improved since its reformation as it now provides yearly 
statistics on the details of its workings.  Thus, this thesis will not only replicate a part of Boyle 
and Thompson‘s 2001 study, but it will also serve as a more updated extension into the workings 
of a legal human rights body and the states over which it holds jurisdiction. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 Considering that human rights is among one of the three central pillars to the Council of 
Europe and that states are not allowed membership status without recognizing it in addition to 
ratifying the European Convention of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights data 
are deemed as an appropriate measure for depicting the use of an international legal body among 
its 47 member states.  The case volume of each state within the Court is the closest manner in 
which to observe human rights commitments, actions, and recognition. 
The dependent variable for this study will be the number of cases that have successfully 
been forwarded to a judicial body from each state in every year, calculated relative to its 
population as shown in Table 1.  The Court‘s official records however, only provide these data 
from 2006; therefore, the data have been completed using both Court case statistics and 
population statistics from Euro Stat Service as described by the Court‘s methodology (The 
European Court of Human Rights 2009).  Because the ECHR was reformed into a full time court 
and because the practice of direct appeal was introduced in 1998, all data for this study will 
begin in 1999 and continue with the latest statistics in 2010. 
For the purposes of this study a higher volume of cases in the European Court, as 
calculated for the dependent variable, does not necessarily indicate a high number of abuses or 
worsening human rights conditions within that member state.  Nor does a low number of cases 
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indicate less human rights abuses or better conditions within a member state.  Rather, a higher 
volume of cases indicates that a member state is allowing submissions to leave its borders and 
into an international court, namely the European Court of Human Rights, thus subjecting it to the 
ruling of a supranational institution.  Alternatively, a lower number of submissions leaving states 
and appearing in Strasbourg could indicate that the state is impeding complaints either by settling 
cases within its domestic courts or making access to domestic remedies difficult for a proper 
settlement to be obtained.  While exact details of the domestic workings within each state are 
difficult to extract, the measure for state strength used in this study is calculated with the 
intention of capturing characteristics determining high versus low case volumes from member 
states.  
The journey of a complaint making its way to a judicial body in the European Court of 
Human Rights is a long and complex one.  First and foremost, before a complaint can be filed 
with the European Court, it must have completely exhausted domestic legal institutions on all 
levels.  If that criterion is satisfied, then the complex system of determining whether or not a 
complaint can be forwarded as a case to a judicial body of the Court begins.  Figure 1 illustrates 
the process of a complaint within the Court after this domestic process and before enforcement 




















Figure 1.  Proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights 
 
  
Source: The European Court of Human Rights. Case-Processing Flow Chart.  2009  
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/How+the+Court+works/Case-processing+flow+chart/ (accessed 
December 3, 2009). 
 
 
The mere process of selecting cases and its eventual journey through the Court is not 
taken lightly by the ECHR.  Court statistics are thus very closely recorded and updated.  The 
numbers of cases from each member state since the start of its membership to the Council of 
Europe are counted, recorded, and reported to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council.  The 
Court does release statistics on which states contain the most number of cases and release reports 
which make those states appear as high violators.  However once the population of that state is 
taken into account, a more accurate picture comes to light.  Thus these statistics when calculated 
together not only provide a more complete view into state activity through a human rights 
implementation mechanism such as an international court, but most importantly it also allows for 
a more realistic view of the level of legal human rights violations within each state and gives an 
insight into how its citizens choose to utilize those legal options available to them. 
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In terms of the dependent variable‘s relationship with state strength, which serves as the 
independent variable in this study, a weak state is expected to yield more cases in the Court 
because of its characteristics as described in the literature.  A weak state is more open and 
dependent on its citizenry thus allowing its citizens to take advantage of all possible remedies for 
human rights violations.  A weak state‘s institutions also tend to be more open and accessible to 
its citizenry.  These features thus show more cases appearing in Strasbourg, not because it is 
demonstrating a lack of commitment to European Convention of Human Rights and the 
institutions intended to uphold it, but rather because it is respecting the Convention by utilizing 
the Court and being subjected to its rulings.  A strong state on the other hand, is expected to yield 
a smaller number of cases in the Court for several possible reasons.  Human rights cases on the 
domestic level within a strong state could be settled either through its institutions or outside of 
them.  Additionally, access to domestic remedies could be difficult within a strong state.  While 
the exact details of potential cases which do not surface in Strasbourg are unknown, the above 
possibilities could discourage citizens seeking remedies to human rights violations from going 
forward to the ECHR and even all remedies within their own state. 
 
Independent Variable & Hypothesis 
As described by Boyle and Thompson state strength can indicate the volume of cases that 
are forwarded from member states to an international court such as the European Court of 
Human Rights.  As explained above a weak state has tendencies to elicit more from its public 
before making formal policy proposals or decisions, whereas a strong state allows less or even no 
degree of openness.  Not only does this level of openness to its citizenry play a part, but it can 
also be used strategically by political elites.  Because strong states act on behalf of the public 
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good rather than working with it, it can become increasingly difficult for an individual to bring 
attention to human rights violations or issues within that state.  Political elites can act 
strategically in thwarting public attention or opposition by such methods as ―making judiciaries 
less accessible, promoting narrower conceptions of law, and generally keeping courts out of 
politics‖ (Jacob 1996, 399).  Human rights and the issues surrounding them are thus kept out of 
the light in order to address another interest.  This can as a result affect the amount of cases that 
arrive to a judicial body in the European Court resulting in a low level of activity from that state 
in a human rights implementation system.  State strength then, as described by Boyle and 
Thompson, has an inverse relationship to the amount of cases that arrive in the European Court.  
Thus, the main hypothesis for this study is as follows. 
 
 Hypothesis: State strength is inversely related to case volume in that the stronger a state 
is relative to its citizenry, the fewer cases it will have in the European Court of Human Rights. 
  
This study employs an index utilized by Boyle and Thompson, which measures the 
degree to which social mobility and legal claims are possible among a population.  This index 
best captures the discussion on weak and strong states outlined in the literature review.  The 
index, originally constructed by Huber et al (1993), creates country scores that range from 0 to 
10 with the lower scores representing weaker states.  Each country score is based on five factors 
intended to capture the degree to which a state allows access to domestic institutions among its 
citizenry.  The first factor in Huber et al‘s index is the strength of federalism with scores 
indicating either no, weak, or strong federalist systems.  Boyle and Thompson explain that 
―federalism encourages mobilization by dividing power between local and centralized 
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governmental bodies‖ (328).  The second, third, and fourth indicators in the state strength index 
are intended to capture the type of government a state contains; existence of a presidential 
system, whether the state adopts a single member district or proportional representation electoral 
system, and the strength of bicameralism.  These factors are intended to offer a glimpse into both 
governmental and societal influences on the overall workings of the state and on the degree of 
reinforcement on each other.  Finally, the importance of referenda is measured and calculated 
into the strength index as a way to capture what Boyle and Thompson claim is ―direct democracy 
through initiatives and referenda.‖  They claim that this can also ―foster greater mobilization‖ 
(328). 
 While the strength index created by Huber et al and utilized in Boyle and Thompson‘s 
study of the European Court of Human Rights appears relatively satisfactory, the five factors 
intended to capture how strong a state is with respect to its legal and societal characteristics are 
predominantly focused on the domestic rather than international environment.  Two of the five 
factors in particular are found to not be particularly relevant to the overall theory of the present 
study.  Yet, the link between domestic and international forces is an essential question for the 
overall purpose of this study.  The first of the two factors which seem out of place for the nature 
of this study is the existence of a presidential system.  The existence of a presidential system 
would appear as important in that it could reveal pertinent information about veto power, for 
example.  While a president has the power to veto legislation within its domestic institutions, it 
becomes more difficult to apply this power in terms of human rights especially when considering 
its connection to international remedies.  Simply measuring the existence of a presidential system 
as 0 or 1 hardly seems to address any relevant information on veto powers.  Additionally, 
differentiating between the type of executive leader within the 47 members of the Council of 
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Europe is not relevant when addressing variations in case volumes in international institutions 
such as the European Court of Human Rights. 
 Secondly, the importance of referenda again would appear as an important aspect when 
considering the relative strength of a state.  This characteristic is indicated as a dummy variable 
which assigns either 0 for ―none or infrequent‖ or 1 for ―frequent‖ (Boyle and Thompson, 328).  
It is indeed important to consider the frequency of referenda or the ability to appeal policies and 
other matters within a respective state‘s governments.  This could indicate how easily a 
population has influence on the overall political process and even how difficult it could be to 
introduce such appeals and have them passed from either the population or even from politicians 
themselves.  However, once again this characteristic is concentrated too much on a domestic 
process.  The importance of referenda within a state‘s domestic politics does not hold any 
relevance in international systems and institutions such as those in the Council of Europe.  While 
there are a few member states that do exercise their referendum rights in particular to human 
rights (e.g. Switzerland), there are more out of the 47 members of the Council, particularly 
member states from the Post-Soviet bloc, who do not.   Thus, this factor is not particularly 
relevant for the purpose of this study.  Having stated the concerns over two of the five factors in 
the state strength index, two alternative factors have been explored in order to replace the 
previous indicators. 
Firstly considering that this study pertains to international legal matters, it is important to 
address how states interpret and implement international law.  How a country incorporates 
international law into its overall domestic legal procedures is a telling way of determining its 
commitment to the human rights treaties it ratifies and its actual practices.  A dualist state that 
makes a distinction between international and domestic law with international legal systems 
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being higher than domestic ones, would be more likely to follow through with its commitments 
to international human rights treaties such as the European Convention.  While scholars such as 
Wildhaber have found that dualist states tend to bring more claims to the European Court of 
Human Rights, the number of these cases has declined over time while their human rights 
violations have also been shown to increase.  This could be because of access to the international 
institutions after all domestic courts have been exhausted.  A monist state on the other hand, 
which does not make the distinction between international and domestic law could show no 
activity on the international level and thus no change to its overall human rights rating as its 
claims would be handled only on the domestic level.  Within the domestic level the case could 
then be ―lost‖ or settled without an attempt to address violations properly.  Thus, a monist state‘s 
apparent commitment could then be perceived simply as a form of window dressing.  This 
replacement factor into the state strength index will be recorded as a dummy variable.  Data from 
the CIA World Factbook provide information on each country‘s domestic legal system.  A value 
of 1 will indicate states as having a dualist approach to international law, while a value of 0 will 
indicate a monist approach. 
The second factor which will be used to replace one of the original five is the frequency 
of membership in IGOs other than the Council of Europe.  Unlike NGOs, IGOs have a more 
direct effect and influence on a state‘s actual government and processes.  A state‘s membership 
in IGOs on a fundamental level opens its government to access, actions, criticism, and even 
sanctions by the international community.  This kind of openness is often viewed as being 
beneficial to the overall health of a state as it allows a more transparent and even democratic 
environment.  This kind of membership also allows for the possibility of what has been referred 
to as the ―boomerang effect.‖  A boomerang effect occurs when individuals who are unable to 
25 
 
find relief for their grievances, turn to actors with international willpower to put pressure on 
domestic governments especially in the area of human rights when there is evidence or 
suggestion that rights are being violated or suppressed (Risse, Ropp and Skikkink, 1999).  
Additionally and perhaps more importantly, membership in several IGOs can allow a state to 
have more influence and authority internationally, especially if the number of its representatives 
grant states more votes in these institutions.  The state with the most memberships in IGOs 
among the 47 members of the COE is a member of just over 100 other international 
organizations.  Thus, one of three values will be assigned to each member state; a low number of 
memberships in IGOs will be assigned a value of 0 while a moderate number will be assigned a 
value of 1, and a high number of memberships will be assigned a value of 2.  These data will be 
gathered from the Yearbook(s) of International Organizations. 
 
Controls 
Several control variables are included in this study, acknowledging past studies that have 
found them to have some explanatory power.  The availability of outlets that allow a population 
to mobilize for human rights is one variable controlled for in this study.  Not only do 
organizations like I/NGOs and even IGOs serve as links between a populace and its government, 
but they also help to bring about political, legal, organizational, or social changes on the 
domestic level.  These organizations also bring more accountability and allow the government to 
be more susceptible to criticism and even praise.  What makes INGOs and NGOs different from 
IGOs, however, is the fact that direct benefits of these groups go to different parties.  INGOs and 
NGOs have more of an effect on a state‘s citizenry, whereas an IGO more directly affects the 
state.  IGOs also hold onto the concept of sovereignty as being of paramount importance.  While 
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the importance and uniqueness of IGOs are acknowledged among the five factors in the 
independent variable, the focus on the impact of NGOs will serve as a control because of its 
more domestic link to the citizenry and government within a state, and for the fact that NGOs are 
given the right to file a complaint against a member state in the European human rights system.  
Like the data for IGOs, the number of active human rights NGOs in each country are provided 
by the Yearbook(s) of International Organizations.   
Additional control variables for each year of each member state since their membership 
to the Council of Europe will consist of the following:  The World Values Survey contains 
relevant questions and data on public opinion within states.  Among the questions is one about 
trust in domestic courts and legal processes.  This could possibly reveal some explanatory power 
in case volume variation from COE member states, as it could show that a populace that does not 
trust its domestic courts is less likely to make claims in them, and thus the frequency of 
grievances lodged at the European Court decreases.  Press freedom scores provided by Reporters 
Sans Frontières are included to address any claims of the lack of press freedom within these 
states.  The polity scores provided by the Polity Project for each country for every year since 
ratification are included in order to measure claims that democratic countries have better human 
rights practices than nondemocratic countries.  Finally, a dummy variable is created to account 
for membership in the European Union.  This could further serve as a democracy claim, given 
that EU members are usually deemed more open and democratic than non-EU members. 
Taking all available variables listed above, the study uses a cross-sectional time series 
analysis of all the current 47 member states to the Council of Europe in order to test each 
country‘s features over the course of membership, starting with data from 1999 when the 
European Court of Human Rights introduced its new form of reporting and statistics after it was 
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reformed into a full-time court in 1998.  By taking into account state strength, acting as an 
independent variable, this study seeks to explain to what degree the strength of a state has on the 
abilities of its citizenry and institutions to utilize the Court in the amount of applications that 
arrive to a judicial body. 
 The approach is a reliable and valid one, although we recognize here some imperfections 
in the data.  One of the biggest problems with human rights data is that it is reported data.  In 
many cases, reports of human rights do not adequately reflect human rights conditions on the 
ground.  Also these data could have been either over or under exaggerated, or simply 
―categorized‖ as indicating a different value.  Another possible problem could be that the newer 
member states to the Council of Europe (e.g, those newly independent states in Central and 
Eastern Europe) are simply too young to show any significance in their human rights practices.  
For example, the latest additions to the Council are Serbia and Montenegro, which ratified the 
convention and became official member states in 2004.  In addition to their ratification year, both 
Serbia and Montenegro are newly independent states.  The data could not be sufficient in regards 
to the amount of years passed since independence for both states. 
 Confirmation of the hypothesis could throw into question the effectiveness of member 
states‘ governments in implementing their human rights commitments.  Because this study 
observes the legal nature of states and mobility of its citizenry, it could show the degree of a 
state‘s willingness or ability to cooperate on a legal level.  A supported hypothesis could also 
bring into question the effectiveness of the European human rights system as it is designed for 
member states to ―learn‖ from the cases submitted against it, and of which it is found at fault.  
The Court has the power to grant monetary compensation from member states to claimants, 
however it has no ability to ensure policy or laws are changed within a state‘s borders to ensure 
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those human rights violations do not reoccur.  Presently, there has been only one incident of a 
member state resigning its membership to the Council of Europe, only to eventually renew it.
2
  
However, never has a member state lost its status because of a human rights issue.   
 On the other hand, should the hypothesis be rejected then the link between a member 
state‘s citizenry and an international court of last resort would be missing an explanatory 
variable; the role of the domestic government and its commitment to human rights.  Domestic 
courts must be exhausted before resorting to the European Court.  Cases intended to reach the 
European Court but failing to do so are ―lost‖ to any explanation of why a human rights violation 
did not reach the international level while perhaps another case of the same violation did.  While 
it is not possible to observe the nature of each individual case, it could be that a state is acting 
strategically or rationally.  The Court‘s data serve as a form of naming and shaming with reports 
being published and reported to the Council‘s sessions.  No member state wants to show up as a 
―high violator‖ to other members.  Yet at the same time, no member state wants to show no 
activity on the basis of suspicion.  Should state strength show no correlation, there would still be 






                                                          
2
 In 1953, Greece formally resigned and denounced the Council of Europe after indicating that it did not wish to 
recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights as outlined in the second protocol in the 
Convention of Human Rights.  The Committee of Ministers had previously stated that Greece had violated several 
articles of the Convention at which Greece held that the second protocol violates its domestic law.  On 28 November 
1974, Greece renewed its ratification and rejoined the Council of Europe (Drzemczewski 1983). 
For analysis on this case consult: A. Ch. Kiss and Ph. Vegleris, ‗L‘affaire grecque devant le Conseil de l‘Europe et 
la Commission europeene des Droits de l‘Homme‘, 17 AFDI (1971), 889-931. 
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 In order to analyze claims to the European Court of Human Rights, annual cross national 
data from the years 1999-2010 were pooled.  Combining time-series and cross-sectional units is 
a useful method of analysis because variation is not limited to cross-national distinctions or 
temporal changes.  Yet, the use of time series data can create problems such as autocorrelation.  
As a consequence, an ordinary least squares estimate could yield results that are unbiased but 
inefficient. 
To avoid the potential problems associated with ordinary least squares estimates and 
autocorrelation, a generalized least squares regression with a fit population-averaged model was 
used in order to correct for autocorrelation.  A lagged dependent variable was also used in order 
to further help control for the effects of autocorrelation.  Because larger states are likely to 
produce more claims in the Court, the natural log of each state‘s population in each year was 
calculated and used as a control variable. 
As may be expected, the descriptive statistics do not provide a clear significant pattern in 
all member states because they do not control for the many possible national differences that can 
be found in each state.  The results of this study‘s time series analysis are presented in Table 3, 
which depicts the effects of all variables measured in the estimates on overall cross-national 
differences and large scale change on the number of allocated cases from each member state in 
each year since 1999.  An additional table on all member states and their state strength score is 






Table 3.  Time Series Analysis of Variables Affecting the Number of Allocated Cases in the European Court of 
Human Rights from Each State in Each Year, 1999-2010 
Variables Coef. Std. Error 
State Weakness 0.053 0.024* 
Cases 0.000 0.000 
Population (logged) 0.005 0.005 
NGOs -0.001 0.000* 
Trust in Legal System -0.012 0.047 
Press Freedom -0.004 0.002 
Polity 0.009 0.006 
EU Membership -0.005 0.052 
Lagged claims 0.873 0.055*** 
* Statistically significant at .05 level 
*** Statistically significant at .001 level 
N= 564 country years 
  
 As predicted by the hypothesis, state strength coincided with more claims in the 
European Court of Human Rights, and the effect was statistically significant at the 0.024 level.  
This finding is consistent with prior research demonstrating that a weak state promotes making 
claims to an international legal body (Boyle 1998, Boyle and Thompson 2001, Kriesi 1995, 
Jacob 1996).  The findings in this study extend into those analyses by linking state strength to 
claims surfacing as cases in the ECHR.  The numbers of cases as reported and published by the 
Court were not shown to be significant thus disproving Boyle and Thompson‘s 2001 study on the 
Court.  This could very likely be due to the fact that the time period examined by Boyle and 
Thompson was a premature version of the Court in its processes and in the number of member 
states.  Secondly, this finding also suggests that simply recording the number of cases from each 
member state and using it as a dependent variable does not reflect a realistic picture of member 
state activities.  Finally, the measure of state strength as used by Boyle and Thompson did not 
effectively measure the level of strength a state has over its citizenry especially when considering 
states that had gained membership after 1993 which were captured in this study.  
31 
 
 The number of active human rights NGOs was shown to be significant at the 0.001 
level, however with a negative coefficient.  This would appear to indicate that there is an inverse 
relationship between the number of allocated cases from member states and the number of active 
human rights NGOs it has.  One possible explanation could be that states with more cases in the 
Court could be showing a trend in which the number of active NGOs is slowly decreasing over 
time.  Additionally, a state with fewer cases in the Court could also be showing a trend in which 
the number of NGOs is slowly raising yet not significantly enough to affect the results.  Indeed 
most of the member states with a small number of NGOs are relatively new members to the 
Council of Europe and are outnumbered by other member states which have been active in the 
Council even prior to 1999.  Perhaps the biggest factor in the findings for NGOs in the data is 
that the method in which it is collected does not portray the full situation within each member 
state.   
 The data on the number of active human rights NGOs was gathered from the Yearbook 
on International Organizations.  This publication states that it reports the number of active NGOs 
that are registered within a state and/or are formally recognized by the United Nations (Year 
Book on International Organizations 7-10).  As a result, the number of active NGOs within each 
member state has the tendency to increase and decrease with each year as new NGOs are 
established and old ones perhaps didn‘t renew their registration or were dismantled.  Most 
importantly however, the Yearbook on International Organization does not distinguish the nature 
of these NGOs other than being categorized as dealing with human rights issues.   
 NGOs can serve different purposes such as serving as watchdogs, offering legal 
services, or merely advocacy.  For example, in Russia there are two NGOs which illustrate this 
point; Memorial and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom.  Both are very active 
32 
 
NGOs working for the promotion of human rights within Russia, however the nature of the work 
between these NGOs is fundamentally different.  Memorial serves not only as an advocacy group 
but also has a staff of lawyers with the purpose of guiding injured parties through Russia‘s courts 
and even acting as representation in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.  The 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom on the other hand, is predominantly an advocacy 
group.  Despite the distinctions between the two groups, both are reported as active human rights 
NGOs within Russia in the Yearbook on International Organizations. 
 Like NGOs, trust in the domestic legal systems and press freedom scores are shown with 
negative coefficients.  Similar explanations could be made like those dealing with active human 
rights NGOs, yet because both of these variables failed to show significance in the results, their 
impact would not affect the overall number of allocated cases from each member state.  Finally, 
the Polity scores of each state and whether or not they are members of the European Union show 
no significance in the results.  This further puts into question previous theories that democracies 
and members of the EU, which are thought of as being more open and democratic, would have 
fewer cases within international legal institutions (Hathaway 2002, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 
2005, Simmons 2009, Neumayer 2005, Wildhaber 2007). 
 
Strong State, Low Case Load: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 While the statistical results above illustrate support for the hypothesis of this study, there 
is an outlying member state which effectively confirms the theory outlined in this study.  Of all 
47 member states tested in this study two states stand out in the state strength scale as being the 
strongest.  Bosnia and Herzegovina received the maximum score of 10 in the state strength scale.  
Yet despite the high rating of strength, in terms of the overall theory of this study Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina has contained a relatively low number of allocated cases in the Court since its 
inclusion in the Council of Europe in 2002 with its peak being 2.53 cases in 2008.  As shown in 
Table 1, the most recent statistics show Bosnia Herzegovina to have a calculated 1.71 cases in 
2010.   
In order to address any possible effects Bosnia and Herzegovina may have on the 
statistical model in this study, an additional model was tested that omitted Bosnia and 
Herzegovina from the dataset.  The result of this test is compared to the result of the previous 
model with all 47 member states in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  Comparative Time Series Analysis of Variables Affecting the Number of Allocated Cases in the European 
Court of Human Rights from 47 States in Each Year Compared to 46 States in Each Year, 1999-2010 
 
                  Model A               Model B 
 
Variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
State Weakness 0.053 0.024* 0.054 0.023* 
Cases 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Population (logged) 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005 
NGOs -0.001 0.000* -0.001 0.000* 
Trust in Legal System -0.012 0.047 -0.000 0.046 
Press Freedom -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.003 
Polity 0.009 0.006 0.024 0.013 
EU Membership -0.005 0.052 -0.005 0.051 
Lagged Claims 0.873 0.055*** 0.875 0.057*** 
* Statistically significant at .05 level 
*** Statistically significant at .001 level 
 Model A: N= 564 country years 
 Model B: N= 552 country years 
 
The result of this second model shows little change not only in the independent variable 
but also in all other variables.  This finding thus illustrates further support for the hypothesis of 
this study in addition to showing Bosnia and Herzegovina‘s overall effect on data for all member 




DAVID AND GOLLIATH: THE CASE OF MONTENEGRO 
In the calculation of state strength, Montenegro received the second highest rating of 9.  
In terms of the number of allocated cases in the Court, Montenegro currently has the highest 
number over all 47 member states with 4.82 cases.  It is perhaps the smallest country in the 
Council of Europe with possibly the largest impact in the data.  In addition to these findings 
Montenegro more than any other state, has also seen the sharpest and fastest surge of cases to the 
Court in its short time as a member state in the Council of Europe.  This trend is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Montenegro‘s Case Activity since Start of Membership in the COE 
 
Among closer observation in the data details on Montenegro, several factors surface that 
could possibly offer explanatory power for the findings tested in this study.  Perhaps the biggest 
factor is the fact that Montenegro is a relatively new state.  Although the Council of Europe had 
already granted membership and had begun to gather data and information, Montenegro formerly 































increase in cases from Montenegro to the European Court of Human Rights.  This could possibly 
hold explanatory power in previous research which claims that states undergo a learning process 
before showing a consistent or satisfactory outcome in human rights practices (Simmons 2009, 
Barsh 1993, Chayes et al 1993, Cortell 1996, Goldman and Jinks 2003, Risse et al 1999).  These 
theories claim that before a consistent pattern is established with newly independent states, its 
human rights practices have to gradually worsen before they can improve.  The process of 
worsening and then the improvement is evident that new developing states are in a learning 
process.  Thus, one can expect a type of bell curve pattern that accommodates this idea 
(Neumayer 2005). 
 Another possible factor in explaining Montenegro as an outlier could lie in the number of 
active human rights NGOs within its borders.  Montenegro as a state is a very small territory 
with a small population.  Within the data, it shows a very small number of human rights NGOs 
with the figure at 11 in 2010; however, those very NGOs could possibly be instrumental in 
seeking international attention and avenues including the European Court of Human Rights.  
Montenegro has repeatedly shown to be inadequate when addressing formalities for victims 
beginning with police and even to domestic courts, which could be as a result of being a newly 
independent state developing its own domestic institutions and procedures.  There have been 
reports of police abuse, deplorable prison conditions, and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity 
and sexual orientation.  As a result current NGOs within the country have responded loudly and 
have been instrumental in seeking damages for injured parties who have undergone a violation of 
their fundamental human rights (U.S. Department of State 2011).   Because of the above reasons, 
this could possibly explain why more cases are surfacing in the Court.  A quantitative test alone 
cannot be used to explain national trends such as the case with Montenegro. 
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A TALE OF TWO OLD MEMBER STATES 
Among the top three states with high case loads in the Court are two states which, unlike 
Montenegro, have been COE member since well before 1999.  Liechtenstein and Slovenia are 
not typically associated with a high number of human rights cases, yet with their number of cases 
being above 4 (Figure 3), speculation and exploration into the details of their data is inevitable.  
While neither Liechtenstein nor Slovenia disproves the hypothesis in this study, they serve as 
intriguing observations because of their more democratic nature and also because of the fact that 
they are not new states unfamiliar to the workings of the Council of Europe. 
 
Source: The European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights- Reports. May 
2010.http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Reports/Annual+Reports/. 
 
 With regards to the state strength measures for both Liechtenstein and Slovenia, neither 
score is high or low as both states fall within the middle of the scale.  Additionally, both states 
are rated with the highest Polity score of 10 and Slovenia in particular has been a member of the 
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Figure 3.  2010 Allocated Cases for all Member States 
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and open media within its borders.  Trust in each state‘s domestic legal system indicates the third 
of four possible answers in which it states ―not very confident.‖  This is also not an unusual 
finding as most member states answered either the second (―somewhat confident‖) or third 
choice, with a heavier weight on the third option.  By taking into account all of the indicators 
from the data in this study, again the literature claiming that democracies and states with more 
open societies, especially those from a powerful supranational institution such as the EU, are 
expected to have fewer cases within international legal institutions (Hathaway 2002, Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui 2005, Simmons 2009, Neumayer 2005, Wildhaber 2007) is brought into 
question. 
 Perhaps where the explanation regarding Liechtenstein and Slovenia‘s caseloads lies is in 
examining the similarities these states have with Montenegro.  Like Montenegro, both 
Liechtenstein and Slovenia are small states with small populations.  Unlike Montenegro, 
however, neither state is newly independent, both within the Council of Europe and 
internationally, undergoing a possible learning curve as proposed by pervious research 
(Neumayer 2005).  Yet, there is a similar pattern in the number of active human rights NGOs 
within both states.  Both Liechtenstein and Slovenia contain a small number of active human 
rights NGOs as reported by the Yearbook on International Organizations.  Thus, one possible 
explanation for their status as outliers could be that the current human rights NGOs within these 
member states are essential and instrumental in settling human rights claims both domestically 
and in the European Court of Human Rights.  These findings could indicate a possible avenue for 
future research in the role of human rights NGOs with regards to an international legal body such 





 In contributing to the overall understanding of cross-national variation in ECHR case 
frequency, the findings of this study suggest that state strength and human rights NGO activity 
each play a role.  Boyle and Thompson‘s 2001 study, which served as a starting model for this 
study, is largely corroborated despite the earlier study‘s reliance on a premature version of the 
European Court of Human Rights and a total of only 21 member states.  Yet even with a surge of 
cases and workload in the Court and the addition of 26 additional member states, state strength 
and NGO activity continue to show significance in the present thesis.  This further confirms that 
the strength of a state does indeed hold some apparent explanatory power in the numbers of cases 
it submits to an international court like the European Court of Human Rights.  Additionally, the 
results found in the present thesis also offer a window into not only the workings and purpose of 
the Court, but also into the workings of domestic courts and their role in implementing and 
respecting international fundamental human rights.  By including more recent data and a revised 
approach, this study serves as a continuation into research on the European human rights system 
and into the overall academic fields of political science, human rights, and international law. 
 One indirect implication that has been acknowledged in the past and is slowly showing 
more focus in contemporary research is the idea that states that are producing the most caseloads 
or activity in an international system could eventually have the greatest influence in shaping 
international law.  Dezalay and Garth, for example, suggest that although citizens in particular 
are bringing forth claims and even criticism against their state to the Court, they may also at the 
same time be introducing their national norms into the system (122).   
For another example, although the overall effect is significantly lessened when calculated 
with its population, Russia currently contributes about a fifth of the total number of cases to the 
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European Court of Human Rights.  Because of this caseload from one member state alone, the 
single judge from Russia currently also works with the judge from Sweden in order to alleviate 
and handle the caseload.  Upon viewing the detailed statistics on Russia alone, over 70% of the 
cases settled pertain to Article 6 in the European Convention on Human Rights, which describes 
the right to a free, fair, and speedy trial.  When viewing the statistics on the nature of cases from 
all 47 member states, the majority of the total caseload in the Court also pertains to Article 6 in 
the Convention.  Dezalay and Garth would thus argue that the Court‘s attention is distracted and 
focuses predominantly on Article 6 cases as the nature of cases from one member state could 
falsely indicate that these abuses are happening more often than other types of abuses (124-125).  
Not only could this possibly be influencing the Court‘s attention, it could also be influencing the 
selection process of claims to the Court and even the cases being decided on the domestic level. 
 More contemporary research on the subject above attributes it to human rights being 
predominantly associated with a purely Western ideal and even claiming a form of Western 
imperialism in that Western states use human rights as a bargaining tool in the international 
arena (Simmons 2009, Wall 2000).  Yet should this theory show some kind of support, the 
European human rights system would be an intriguing case as the influence in the example above 
is coming from an Eastern state rather than a Western state. 
 Finally, the findings of this study have implications outside of Europe.  Because 
significance was found pertaining to state strength and human rights NGOs in a relatively 
homogeneous sample, it is possible that variation also exists on a bigger or more international 
level.  Additionally, because the European human rights system is seen as a model to other 
regional and even international court systems, this study‘s findings could serve as a reference for 
further influence or reform on the international level.  While it is far from perfect, the European 
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human rights system is perhaps the best system for human rights currently in existence.  Indeed 
because of the European system‘s long history, use, and even effectiveness, it will continue to be 
seen as a model supranational legal system for the protection of fundamental human rights both 
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 Appendix A 
 
Calculated State Strength Scale for 47 Countries 
 
Country SS Country SS 
Denmark 3 United Kingdom 5 
Greece 3 Andorra 6 
Bulgaria 4 Iceland 6 
Croatia 4 Ireland 6 
Cyprus 4 Liechtenstein 6 
Estonia 4 Slovenia 6 
Germany 4 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 6 
Latvia 4 Albania 7 
Luxembourg 4 France 7 
Moldova 4 Netherlands 7 
Poland 4 Romania 7 
Slovakia 4 Serbia 7 
Spain 4 Turkey 7 
Switzerland 4 Ukraine 7 
Austria 5 Armenia 8 
Belgium 5 Azerbaijan 8 
Czech Republic 5 Georgia 8 
Finland 5 Italy 8 
Hungary 5 Monaco 8 
Lithuania 5 Russia 8 
Malta 5 San Marino 8 
Norway 5 Montenegro 9 
Portugal 5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 10 
Sweden 5   
 
*Score is based on a 0-10 (weak- strong) scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
